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Although regular polysemy (e.g., producer for product (John read Dickens) or container 
for contents (John drank the bottle)) has been extensively studied, there has been little 
work on why certain polysemy patterns are more acceptable than others. We take an 
empirical approach to the question, in particular evaluating an account based on rules 
against a gradient account of polysemy that is based on various radical pragmatic theories 
(Fauconnier, 1984; Nunberg, 1995). Under the gradient approach, possible senses 
become more acceptable as they become more closely related to a word’s default 
meaning, and the apparent regularity of polysemy is an artifact of having many similarly 
structured concepts. Using methods for measuring conceptual structure drawn from 
cognitive psychology, Study 1 demonstrates that a variety of metrics along which 
possible senses can be related to a default meaning, including conceptual centrality, cue 
validity and similarity, are surprisingly poor predictors of whether shifts to those senses 
are acceptable. Instead, sense acceptability was better explained by rule-based approaches 
to polysemy (e.g., Copestake & Briscoe, 1995). Study 2 replicated this finding using 
novel word meanings in which the relatedness of possible senses was varied. However, 
while individual word senses were better predicted by polysemy rules than conceptual 
metrics, our data suggested that rules (like producer for product) had themselves arisen to 
mark senses that, aggregated over many similar words, were particularly closely related. 
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1 Introduction 
 Although most words have relatively stable form representations, their 
interpretations change frequently to suit the context. Particularly interesting in this regard 
is the phenomenon of regular polysemy, in which similar alternations between senses 
extend across a whole class of lexical items (see Table 1). For instance, words for 
producers can also be used for their products, e.g., thirsty/magnificent Beethoven, 
hungry/valuable Picasso, drunken/epic Hemingway.  
 Regular polysemy is typically modeled as the application of lexical rules, like 
producer-product, which take words from within one particular semantic field and shift 
that sense to another (Copestake & Briscoe, 1995; Murphy, 1997; Ostler & Atkins, 1992; 
Pustejovsky, 1995). Alternatively, such rules have also been proposed to operate within 
the syntax (Borer, 2005) or during semantic composition (Dölling, 1995). As a 
psychological explanation, these rules have certain advantages; in particular they account 
for the generative nature of regular polysemy, avoid the need to list predictable senses in 
the mental lexicon, and provide a good analogy with morphological rules. But while 
researchers have made progress in providing accounts of how regular polysemy operates, 
as well as documenting different types of regular polysemy, rule-based theories have 
made little progress in explaining why particular regularities exist. Most models of 
regular polysemy are purely descriptive, and do not try to account for why it is possible 
to use a producer to stand for its product, but not to use a product to stand for its producer 
(e.g., the 9th symphony was deaf cannot describe Beethoven’s hearing loss).  
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Table 1. Examples of regular polysemy. 
Regular Polysemy Default Sense 
Example 
Shifted Sense 
Example 
Generalizations 
Object –  
Abstract Object 
The shiny DVD The hour-long 
DVD 
CD/record/film/disc… 
Container– 
Contents 
The broken pot The boiling pot pan/dish/ 
kettle/cauldron… 
Institution– Person  The large nunnery The friendly 
nunnery 
school/university/ 
church/bakery… 
Animal –  
Food  
 The noisy chicken The tasty chicken rabbit/lamb 
/penguin/sasquatch… 
 
 Here, we take an experimental approach to explaining why certain shifts between 
senses are more acceptable than others. In particular, we test whether discrete rules are 
necessary to explain regular polysemy, or whether seemingly rule-based shifts could be 
explained by a more gradient account, one in which senses are instead assigned based on 
whether they are closely related to the default meaning of a word. 
 More specifically, we test the predictions of a variety of radical pragmatic 
conceptualizations of word meaning (Fauconnier, 1985; Nunberg, 1995; Papafragou, 
1996; Strigin, 1998). These theories have been amongst the few to provide justifications 
for why only certain shifts between senses are permissible. Lexical entries are not 
modified by rules operating over specific links between semantic classes (e.g., between 
containers and contents), but instead changes in sense occur because world knowledge is 
used to infer which meanings are plausible for a word. For instance, Nunberg (1995) 
argued that a word’s sense could be shifted from one meaning to another whenever the 
latter became particularly “noteworthy” in the context, i.e., when there is an important 
relation between the two. A sentence like the hour-long DVD is felicitous because movies 
are noteworthy in the context of DVD discs (DVDs are made to store and play movies, 
RESTRICTING REGULAR POLYSEMY 
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they have pictures of movies on their covers, etc). However DVD discs are not 
particularly noteworthy when thinking about movies (unlike actors, directors, etc.), hence 
the shiny movie is unlicensed. Another example can be seen in the acceptability of Plato 
is on the top shelf (Fauconnier, 1984). There is an important link between Plato and his 
works, which allows the former to stand for the latter; however the link from Plato’s 
works back to the author is not as strong. Rather, the most obvious links are to various 
philosophical ideas, and so The Republic died in Athens does not have an interpretation 
where The Republic refers to Plato. 
 Under radical pragmatic theories, many of the sense shifts that are typically 
explained by regular polysemy rules (like producer-product or object-abstract object) are 
just epiphenomena of a set of concepts being similarly structured, resulting in similar 
senses. Just as DVDs are closely associated with movies, so a CD will be closely 
associated with the music it contains (the classical CD) and a book will be closely 
associated with its story (the thrilling book). Similarly, a shift from producers to products 
will also appear to be a rule because the people it applies over (writers, composers, 
artists) are all intimately associated with their work. The apparently regular and rule-
governed nature of lexical semantics results from regularities in the mental representation 
of the external world. That said, these theories do also have a place for mechanisms akin 
to polysemy rules. For example, Nunberg (1995) acknowledges that conventional, 
language-specific polysemy patterns exist. But these conventions are implemented by the 
same noteworthiness-based mechanism, and so his theory predicts that world knowledge 
should affect sense acceptability independently of any rule. 
 Within radical pragmatics, disputes arise as to which aspects of world knowledge 
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define sense acceptability. As mentioned, Nunberg (1995) argues that senses are assigned 
based on noteworthiness: if another meaning is noteworthy for a word given the context, 
that meaning is assignable. Researchers in the relevance theory tradition have made 
proposals along similar lines, advocating that senses are licensed when they are relevant 
to the current situation (Papafragou, 1996; Wilson, 2003).1 Finally, Fauconnier (1984) 
argues that one meaning can be shifted to another if the two meanings are connected 
within an “Idealized Cognitive Model,” a model of conceptual representation drawn from 
cognitive linguistics. Such connections signal important relations between concepts, 
which can arise for a variety of reasons (e.g., cultural importance). The ability to set up a 
new connection and therefore a new sense will depend on the importance of that relation. 
 Although notions like noteworthiness and relevance are intuitively appealing 
explanations for why we can talk about the hour-long DVD but not the shiny movie, what 
they describe is not entirely clear. One possibility is that they can be defined in terms of 
relatively low-level metrics. In previous work, Nunberg (1979) had suggested that the cue 
validity of the default sense for the shifted sense might be critical. The notion of cue 
validity is derived from Eleanor Rosch’s work on categorization (e.g., Rosch & Mervis, 
1975), and describes the conditional probability of an entity being in a category given 
that it has a feature, e.g., the probability that an object is an elephant given that it has 
tusks. Of course, senses should not be thought of as features, for instance, a paraphrase of 
the hour-long DVD is not ‘the hour-long contains a movie’. Instead, Nunberg’s cue 
validity should be thought of as the probability of one concept (a movie) occurring in the 
context of another (a DVD), independently of why they are associated (i.e., no matter 
                                                 
1 Although what makes a sense relevant differs between theories. 
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whether the DVD contains the movie, is used for pirating the movie, etc). This matches 
our intuitions regarding our current polysemy examples: given a DVD disc, it is relatively 
predictable that it will be somehow associated with a movie, but given a movie one might 
not want to predict that it is associated with a DVD. We therefore tested whether cue 
validity predicted sense acceptability. 
 But noteworthiness, relevance and Fauconnier’s links seem to reflect a higher level 
of conceptual structure than simple cue validity. What all these theories have in common 
is the assumption that senses become licensed when they are somehow intrinsically 
related, that is to say, secondary senses have to play some important role in our 
conceptualization of the first sense. By contrast, cue validity allows senses to be related 
for accidental or extrinsic reasons. 
 Intrinsic relatedness can be well expressed and operationalized by the notion of 
“conceptual centrality” (Ahn, 1998; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Sloman, Love, & Ahn, 
1998). Taken from cognitive psychology, conceptual centrality describes the extent to 
which one aspect of a concept causes other features to come about. For instance, the fact 
that animals have DNA causes a range of other animal properties, so DNA is 
conceptually central for a modern-day understanding of animals. In terms of polysemy, 
conceptual centrality can be thought of as the extent to which the secondary sense causes 
important features of the primary sense, e.g., we are licensed to assign the word DVD a 
movie sense because DVDs are designed to play movies, and therefore movies 
necessitate various facts about DVDs and their design. 
 The importance of central features has been emphasized in various theoretical 
accounts of conceptual representation (Ahn, Gelman, Amsterlaw, Hohenstein, & Kalish, 
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2000; Carey, 1985; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Rehder, 2003; Sloman, et al., 1998), and 
confirmed by a number of experimental tests (Ahn, et al., 2000; Rehder & Hastie, 2004; 
Rehder & Kim, 2006; Sloman, et al., 1998). Central features play a particularly 
prominent role in knowledge-based accounts of concepts (Carey, 1985; Murphy & 
Medin, 1985). In this account, the coherence of a concept (similar to its naturalness) is 
determined by the extent to which it can be explained via an intuitive theory. Central 
features by definition cause (and thus explain) a large number of other features, and so 
provide the glue that makes a concept cohere. If word meanings reflect our concepts, then 
central features that are important for characterizing a concept should also be important 
for characterizing the senses associated with it.2 We therefore tested whether conceptual 
centrality accurately predicted sense acceptability. 
 Of course, it could be that sense acceptability does not depend on concepts being 
intrinsically related, and instead the secondary sense just has to be particularly prominent 
when thinking of the default sense. In her relevance-theoretic account of sense change, 
Papafragou (1996) argues along these lines, and proposes that relevant senses are 
determined by salience. Salience describes whether a feature is “attention grabbing”, 
independent of whether it is frequent or central. For example, the fact that sharks eat 
people is salient, even though it is rare and necessitates little else about sharks. Under this 
account, when thinking of the word DVD, movie would be a salient concept, which 
would make a movie sense licensed. We therefore examined whether salience predicts 
sense acceptability. 
                                                 
2 Indeed, Sloman et al. (1998) have argued that central features are critical for metaphors, 
insomuch as they resist transformation and so constrain which interpretations are 
possible, which provides some indirect support for this idea. 
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 The theories discussed above have assumed that word senses are related, but not 
necessarily overlapping, aspects of conceptual structure. For example, while DVD’s are 
related to movies, they do not share many features. By contrast, an alternative assumption 
in polysemy is that word senses do overlap in meaning, that is to say they are similar. 
Similar concepts share structure and features (e.g., a volcano and a mountain are both 
similar and related, while a volcano and a volcanologist are related but not similar), and 
similarity is critical for theories of conceptual representation. For instance, people 
categorize similar items together and dissimilar items apart, and are more likely to make 
property inductions from one item to a similar alternative.  
 Despite its importance for the psychology of concepts, similarity seems an 
intuitively implausible predictor of sense acceptability (movies and DVDs are clearly not 
similar, yet hour-long DVD is licensed). Nevertheless, certain senses do appear to be 
similar (such as the different senses of the words ring and line), and various theories have 
argued that similarity licenses senses. For instance, Apresjan (1974) explicitly proposes 
that polysemous senses are similar to one another, while Gibbs and colleagues (Gibbs, 
Beitel, Harrington, & Sanders, 1994)  argue that different senses of the word stand reflect 
meanings that are similar to one of a small number of prototypical meanings.  
 Experimental evidence, however, tends not to support these theories. Klein and 
Murphy (2001, 2002) demonstrated that the typical effects of similarity do not hold 
between polysemous senses: different senses are not rated as particularly similar, are not 
categorized together, and do not license inductive inferences from one to the other (e.g., 
if wrapping paper increases in cost, subjects do not infer that a liberal paper will increase 
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in cost). All of this is inconsistent with representational overlap between senses; indeed 
Klein and Murphy (2002) endorse the idea that senses are related but not similar. 
 Still, there are reasons to pause before fully accepting the conclusion that similarity 
plays little role in polysemy. First, Klein and Murphy studied relations between 
acceptable senses, rather than contrasting acceptable and unacceptable senses. Similarity 
may still be important for determining whether a sense is licensed, even if it has little 
effect on processing within licensed senses. Second, their materials mixed different types 
of polysemy. Some senses were regular (e.g., noisy/tasty chicken) but others were 
irregular (e.g. the different senses of trunk (of a car/similar to a suitcase) do not represent 
one instance of a lexical generalization that cuts across English). It may be that similarity 
is unimportant for irregular polysemy, but important for regular polysemy, where new 
senses often have to be generated. 
 In summary, the present study investigates whether restrictions on polysemous 
senses can arise from the graded structure of our conceptual representations. We test 
whether the acceptability of a sense increases as it becomes more related to the default 
meaning, via either conceptual centrality, cue validity or salience, or alternately whether 
senses become licensed if they are conceptually overlapping, i.e., are similar. These 
possibilities were contrasted with the hypothesis that sense acceptability is determined by 
whether or not a word’s default meaning falls within the semantic field of a licensed 
polysemy rule. 
 Study 1 assessed whether relatedness or rules better explained word sense 
acceptability for a large set of extant English words. Using word pairs, we recorded how 
willing participants were to let one word be used in place of its pair (e.g., use the word 
RESTRICTING REGULAR POLYSEMY 
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DVD to mean movie), and vice versa. Importantly, a licensed shift allowed one meaning 
to be generated from the other word, but not the other way around. At the same time we 
gathered information about the similarity of the two words’ meanings, whether one 
meaning was conceptually central for the other, and whether they were related through 
either cue validity or salience. Current radical pragmatic theories predict that sense 
acceptability should be tightly related to at least one of our conceptual measures. In 
particular, most theories predict that acceptability should increase as conceptual centrality 
increases.3 By contrast, fully rule-based theories predict that senses within the semantic 
field of a licensed polysemy rule should be acceptable, and make no predictions about the 
relationship between sense acceptability and conceptual structure.  
 Study 2 went beyond a regression-based analysis. We constructed a number of 
artificial vocabulary items (as in Murphy, 1997) which varied both in whether they could 
be entered into a licensed shift, and in whether the possible shifted meaning constituted a 
central part of the artificial item’s description. This allowed us to test the causal efficacy 
of these two factors in creating a shiftable meaning. 
 
2 Study 1 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants 
46 participants provided judgments of sense acceptability via the paraphrase task. A 
                                                 
3 Note that other possible radical pragmatic theories could potentially rely on metrics that 
are untested here, so it will not be possible to definitively rule out the whole class of 
theories based on these data. 
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different set of 12 participants provided judgments for each conceptual metric. All were 
college undergraduates receiving course credit for participation. 
 
2.1.2 Materials 
 We took 60 pairs of words (e.g., DVD, movie), 15 for each of four known regular 
polysemy patterns, which changed the meaning of one word to the meaning of its pair 
(i.e., the word DVD has a sense akin to the word movie), but not vice versa. In the 
following discussion, reference to an item describes an ordered word pair (e.g., the pairs 
(DVD, movie) and (movie, DVD) are different items). 
 The four regularities used were object-abstract object (e.g., DVD, movie), 
container-contents (e.g., pot, liquid), producer-product (e.g., writer, book) and institution-
person (e.g., hospital, doctor). We then devised an additional 120 sentence frames that 
acted as contexts to select for the senses (e.g., was an hour long, was round). We chose 
word pairs based on our intuition that they fell into the relevant semantic fields (e.g., 
containers) for the licensed and unlicensed rules. We chose contexts based on our 
intuition that they strongly selected for the default sense of a word (i.e., the abstract 
meaning of movie, the object meaning of DVD). 
 The word pairs were matched in number of morphemes and length. However we 
were unable to control for frequency: the words that did not enter the regular shift had 
higher frequency. Given that more frequent words are in fact known to be more 
polysemous (Zipf, 1945), we assumed that this difference should not affect our results, 
but we also carried out an analysis that accounted for it (see footnote 5 in the analysis and 
results section.) 
RESTRICTING REGULAR POLYSEMY 
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2.1.3 Measuring sense acceptability 
How do you assess whether a word like DVD has both a disc and a film sense? One 
possibility would be to collect informant judgments (as for syntactic acceptability), but 
this requires considerable metalinguistic contemplation, and informants may have 
difficulty recalling particularly low frequency senses. Instead, we settled on paraphrase 
judgments, in which we tested whether the target word (DVD) could acceptably replace 
its paired word (movie). Since the target and paired words had very different default 
meanings (DVD  = disc, movie = film), a paraphrase was only acceptable if the sense of 
the target could be shifted to something like the meaning of its paired word. For example, 
participants judged whether they agreed or disagreed with statements like “‘The movie 
was an hour long’ can be paraphrased as ‘The DVD was an hour long’” or “‘The DVD 
was shiny’ can be paraphrased as ‘The movie was shiny’.” 
 Participants made these judgments by sliding a bar on a continuous scale between 
the poles Disagree and Agree, and ratings were z-scored within subjects. All stimuli were 
presented using scripts developed using the PyPsyExp Python library (Gureckis, 2009). 
We used a latin square design, such that each participant received only one of the two 
possible items from each pair. Items are given in Appendix 1. 
 
2.1.4 Measuring the relatedness of meanings  
 We estimated the relevant conceptual metrics by collecting verbal ratings from 
participants. We chose these metacognitive tasks over other behavioral measures such as 
priming or classification because it is unclear exactly which conceptual constructs are 
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tapped by behavioral tasks. To measure similarity, we simply asked participants to make 
judgments of the form “How similar is a DVD to a movie?” on a continuous scale 
between Not at all similar – Very similar. Before answering, participants were told that 
the questions were supposed to measure the extent to which two items were the same sort 
of thing, and were given examples of both similar and dissimilar pairs of items. 
 Calculating centrality was more complicated. As a measure of conceptual 
centrality, we used a metric from Sloman et al. (1998): judgments of similarity to an 
ideal. In particular, we asked participants to rate how much the absence of a relationship 
with the to-be-shifted sense made the target’s meaning less ideal. All questions were of 
the same form: “Think of an ideal DVD. How similar is a DVD that is not associated 
with a movie to an ideal DVD?”. If a sense is particularly central in the target word’s 
concept, then other features should also depend on it, and so its absence should make the 
concept considerably less ideal. Participants provided ratings on the scale Not at all 
similar – Very similar. We inverted these ratings to create a centrality score (low 
similarity to ideal = high centrality).  Before answering the questions, participants were 
instructed to think about how they would describe an ideal version of an example object 
(e.g., a mechanic). Then, they were instructed to imagine that object, but now not 
associated with another object (e.g., a mechanic not associated with tools). Finally, they 
were asked whether that new object was similar to the original ideal version. 
 When measuring centrality, we used “associated with” rather than provide a 
specific relation (e.g., contains a movie). This was to avoid conflating the centrality of a 
sense with the specified relation. We hoped to abstract over different cases, and thereby 
collect the average centrality of a concept. 
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 We also used Sloman et al. (1998)’s methods to measure cue validity and salience. 
Again, all questions took the same basic form. For cue validity, participants answered 
questions such as “Of all the things associated with a DVD, what percentage are 
movies?” (rating the answer from 0-100%). If the concept DVD is a valid cue to the 
concept movie, the latter should be frequently associated with the former. To some 
extent, this question also measures diagnosticity, which describes the extent to which 
DVD cues movie and only movie. For instance, if DVD validly cues movie, as well as 
many other concepts (i.e., it is not particularly diagnostic), participants should provide a 
low rating. We considered this conflation acceptable because prior theories relying on 
cue validity did not consider the importance of diagnosticity, and yet diagnosticity a 
priori seems just as likely to play a role as cue validity (if the measure provides a handle 
on sense acceptability, follow-up work could distinguish the two possible causes.) To 
ensure participants were answering the questions as intended, they were instructed to 
think about things associated with some examples (e.g., associates of a mechanic), and 
what percentage of those things were a second type of thing (e.g., some tools). 
 Finally, to assess the relative salience of the two concepts, participants made 
judgments of prominence: “When you think about a DVD, to what extent do you think 
about a movie?” (rating from Not at all prominent to Very prominent). Salient concepts 
should frequently come to mind, and have a prominent place in participants’ thoughts, 
even when they are neither cue valid or central. Before answering, participants were 
instructed to think about whether, when thinking about one example item (e.g., a 
mechanic), another item (some tools) would be one of the first things to “pop into their 
head.” 
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 Judgments were again made on a continuous scale, with ratings z-scored within 
individual subjects. Again, we used a latin square design with each participant receiving 
one of the two possible items per pair. Examples of each question type are given in Table 
2 below. 
 
Table 2. Examples of the questions asked for each metric for the (DVD, movie) pair. The 
names were reversed for the pair (movie, DVD). 
Metric Question 
Similarity How similar is a DVD to a movie? 
Centrality Think of an ideal DVD. How similar is a DVD that is not 
associated with a movie to an ideal DVD? 
Cue Validity Of all the things associated with a DVD, what percentage 
are movies? 
Salience When you think about a DVD, to what extent do you 
think about a movie? 
 
2.1.5 Procedure 
Participants were tested, up to four at a time, at individual computer terminals. Prior to 
each test, participants were given a training period. For the paraphrase task, the training 
was entirely computer-based. Participants were told they would be rating the extent to 
which one sentence conveyed the same meaning as another despite the difference in 
words, and were shown a set of example paraphrases (e.g., Mary was happy cannot be 
paraphrased as The tree was happy, John was happy can be paraphrased as The man was 
happy). Finally they were shown how to give ratings using the slider. 
 Participants in the conceptual tasks were told that the experiment was designed to 
elicit their ratings of how everyday things are related to other everyday things. Training 
began with a short discussion by the experimenter on the aims for the particular measure, 
RESTRICTING REGULAR POLYSEMY 
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and description of how to think about two examples. An example script is given in 
Appendix C. The relevant descriptions are given in section 2.1.4. 
 After this discussion, participants were walked through two practice questions on 
the computer, in which they were shown how to answer using the slider. They were told 
the experimenter’s intuition about what the answer to each question should be, but it was 
emphasized that their judgments in the experiment should reflect their own intuitions. 
Finally, the experimenter elicited and answered questions. 
 
2.2 Results 
 Figure 1 shows that the sense acceptability ratings were reliably greater for those 
items that entered into a licensed regularity (Licensed: M = 0.53 (SD = 0.56); 
Unlicensed: M = -0.53 (0.45), t(118) = 11.45, p < .01), but there was still considerable 
variability within the two sets, which overlapped. We next assessed what best predicted 
that variation. If the sole contributor to sense acceptability is a set of rules, we would not 
expect to find that any of the conceptual metrics predict sense acceptability. But if any 
metric does come out as a strong predictor, that would lend support to a radical 
pragmatics-type theory. 
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Figure 1.  
Caption: Points show normalized sense acceptability ratings for each item, split by 
participation in a licensed regular shift (black circles, e.g., the word DVD used with a 
movie sense) or an unlicensed shift (grey squares, e.g., the word movie used with a DVD 
sense). Thick black lines indicate mean score; * = p < .05. 
 
 To assess these hypotheses, we simultaneously regressed sense acceptability against 
each of our conceptual metrics, using a multi-level model with random intercepts for the 
different regular polysemy patterns (n = 120, deviance = 238, Gelman & Hill, 2007).4 In 
addition, Table 3 shows the first order correlations between the various conceptual 
metrics and sense acceptability. 
                                                 
4 We calculated p-values using Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo estimates of the coefficients, 
using the pvals.fnc function in the languageR library (Baayen, 2008). 
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 Following Klein & Murphy (2002, p. 556), who found that extant polysemous 
senses were generally not rated as similar, we found that the degree of similarity between 
a word’s meaning and a potential sense did not predict whether that sense was acceptable. 
Figure 2 shows that there was no major difference in similarity scores between the items 
that did and did not fall into a licensed shift (Licensed: M = -0.02 (0.66); Unlicensed: M 
= 0.02 (0.61); t(118) = 0.33, ns), and more importantly similarity did not reliably predict 
sense acceptability (β = -0.16, standard error (se) = 0.12, t = 1.3, ns).5 This is not 
consistent with any radical pragmatics hypothesis that takes similarity to be the major 
conceptual metric determining polysemy. 
 
 
Figure 2  
Caption: (a) Difference in similarity scores between word pairs related via a licensed or 
unlicensed shift. (b) Sense acceptability score of a word pair against similarity score.  
 
                                                 
5 This result, and the results for centrality, cue validity and salience, did not change when 
lexical frequency of the items was included in the regression. 
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 Centrality, our operationalization of noteworthiness, proved to be a more reliable 
predictor of sense acceptability: the extent to which a potential sense was central for the 
initial meaning was related to sense acceptability. However, the effect was complicated. 
Figure 3a shows that there was a small difference in centrality between senses that fell 
into licensed and unlicensed shifts, with the latter less likely to be central (Licensed: M = 
0.28 (0.77); Unlicensed: M = -0.28 (0.64); t(118) = 4.4, p < .01). Furthermore, sense 
acceptability increased with increasing centrality (β = 0.33, se = 0.14, t = 2.39, p = .02, 
Figure 3b).  
 
Figure 3 
Caption: (a) Difference in centrality scores between word pairs related via a licensed or 
unlicensed shift. (b) Sense acceptability score of a word pair against centrality score. 
 
 But direct inspection of the second graph in Figure 3 suggests that it is not simply 
the case that being central automatically makes a sense acceptable. In particular, note that 
the points in Figure 3b appear to fall into two clusters, senses that are derived by a 
licensed shift (black circles) and senses that are not (grey squares). Between these 
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clusters, there is a large reliable difference in sense acceptability but only a smaller 
difference in associated centrality scores: compared to senses derived by an unlicensed 
shift, senses derived by a licensed shift tend to describe concepts that play a more central 
role in the default senses. However within each cluster, centrality is not a good predictor, 
despite its variability. The grey lines in Figure 3b show that the effect of centrality on 
acceptability was not reliable for the unlicensed items (β = -0.03, se = 0.11, t = 0.14, ns.) 
and was only marginal for the licensed items (β = 0.18, se = 0.1, t = 1.78, p = .09). This 
would not be expected under a centrality-based gradient account. It is more consistent 
with a rule-based model, in which falling under a rule is the primary determinant of sense 
acceptability, and centrality plays a limited role at best. 
 Finally, we assessed whether our other conceptual measures reliably predicted any 
additional variance in sense acceptability. They did not (Cue Validity: β = 0.16, se = 
0.13, t = 1.2, ns.; Salience: β = 0.06, se = 0.13, t = 0.47, ns.), although as can be seen in 
Table 3, the two measures were correlated with centrality, suggesting that a common 
factor may contribute to variance in each. Still, because conceptual centrality offered the 
most predictive power, a provisional conclusion should be that, to the extent polysemy 
rules are in any way dependent on world knowledge, the metric they depend on is similar 
to centrality. 
 
 
Table 3 First order correlations between the different measures used. 
 
 Similarity Centrality Cue Validity Salience 
Sense Acceptability 0.08 0.33 0.31 0.23 
Similarity  0.45 0.50 0.50 
Centrality   0.74 0.74 
Cue validity    0.77 
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2.3 Discussion 
 Study 1 tested whether the acceptability of extended senses for a large set of words 
could be explained by how related they were to their default meaning, or whether a more 
traditional rule-based approach provided a better fit to the data. We demonstrated that one 
conceptual metric, similarity, was a very poor predictor of sense acceptability, despite its 
importance for theories of concepts and categories. This replicated previous work by 
Klein and Murphy (2001, 2002), and extended it to additional forms of regular polysemy. 
In tandem with Klein and Murphy’s results, we think the present data provide relatively 
conclusive evidence that the extent to which two concepts overlap in meaning has very 
little effect on sense acceptability.  
 The best indication of an effect of conceptual relatedness came from our centrality 
measure: acceptable senses tended to be more central, and cue validity and salience did 
not predict any additional variation in acceptability. This is consistent with theories in 
which an intrinsic relation between concepts licenses polysemy (e.g., Fauconnier, 1985; 
Nunberg, 1995; Wilson, 2003), but not with the theories of Nunberg (1979) and 
Papafragou (1996) which specifically rely on cue validity and salience, respectively.  
 However, the effect of centrality was not particularly robust: within the set of 
unlicensed shifts, centrality did not reliably predict acceptability, and within the set of 
licensed shifts it only marginally predicted acceptability. Instead, the effect occurred 
because items participating in a licensed shift tended to be considerably more acceptable 
overall, but only a little more central. 
 What could explain the small but reliable effect of conceptual centrality? It may be 
that both radical pragmatics and rule-based models are correct, and centrality and 
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polysemy rules act relatively independently to produce word meanings. Copestake and 
Briscoe (1995) suggest such a two-system account, in which both polysemy rules and 
more pragmatic transfers of reference can occur. But this would not predict centrality’s 
lack of an effect within the licensed and unlicensed clusters, unless it was simply an issue 
of power. 
 An alternative is that centrality predicts the occurrence of polysemy rules: rules 
tend to describe relationships that are central for a large number of lexical items. 
However, once the rule is in place, its application is more or less independent of 
centrality. This would account for the small difference in centrality between licensed and 
unlicensed senses. 
 A final possibility is that polysemy rules rely, to an extent, on centrality: for a rule 
to operate properly on a word, that relationship has to be relatively central. For instance, 
the word pot can be entered into a container-contents rule because the fact that pots are 
containers is a relatively central aspect of the concept underlying the word. By contrast 
the word tree cannot be entered into the same rule, because trees are not obvious 
containers. This would explain the marginal effect of centrality on sense acceptability for 
items from the licensed shifts, and the non-reliable effect for items from the unlicensed 
shifts. 
 In summary, we see three possible explanations for the centrality results in Study 1.  
i) Centrality and polysemy rules both cause sense acceptability, and we lacked 
the power to determine this. 
ii) Centrality does not cause sense acceptability, but does predict the presence or 
absence of a polysemy rule. 
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iii) Polysemy rules can only be used when the relationship they describe is 
central for the concept.  
 
3 Study 2 
 To evaluate these hypotheses, we created a set of artificial lexical items and tested 
how easily they could be shifted to a different sense. This allowed us to experimentally 
manipulate whether the meaning of a word had a central relationship to another possible 
sense, and whether the shift in sense fell under a licensed template. By crossing these 
factors, we could tease apart the true determinants of sense acceptability. It also allowed 
us to confirm that the effects in Study 1 reflected causation rather than correlation, 
because subjects here had no experience with the secondary sense prior to our collecting 
their judgment.  
 Half our artificial words described novel types of containers, which could enter into 
a licensed container-contents shift. The other half were potential contents, in particular, 
different types of substances. These could only enter into an unlicensed contents-
container shift. To make the shifted meaning central, we designed coherent reasons why 
it would be important for the item. For example, one container (a ternway, see example 1) 
was designed to hold water, and one example of some contents (some zav, see example 
2) had to be kept in a special container, because it was a powerful solvent. To make the 
shifted meanings non-central, we simply mentioned them as incidental parts of the 
concept: the ternway happened to have water in it, or the zav just happened to be in a 
particular container. 
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 We used a similar paraphrase task to measure sense acceptability for the novel 
items, but embedded in slightly more context in order to provide more information. 
Participants first read a description of the novel word‘s meaning, in which centrality was 
varied. This was followed by a short scenario in which the item was used.  
 The final sentence of the scenario contained a reference to the intended shifted 
meaning of the item (in example 1, the contents of the ternway (water), and in 2, the 
container of the zav (a jar)). Participants were asked to judge whether that sentence was 
well paraphrased if the novel word was substituted in place of the alternative meaning. 
Ratings were made on a scale between 1 (Unacceptable to switch) and 7 (Totally 
acceptable to switch). The same scenarios were used for both the central and non-central 
versions of each item. 
1. Description: A ternway is a large metal object. Ternways are found on farms. 
Central: They are strong but hollow. Farmers fill them with water, so that 
animals can drink from them. 
Non-Central: They are strong but hollow. Farmers use them to build 
temporary constructions and shelters for their animals. 
Scenario: One day, Harry was inspecting one of his ternways. It was full of water. 
At that moment, his neighbor, Bob walked by. Bob stopped to say hello. As they 
chatted, Harry rested his hand on the ternway. He absent-mindedly stirred the 
water with his finger.  
Question: How acceptable would it have been to instead have said that, ‘He 
absent-mindedly stirred the ternway with his finger.’ and have meant the same 
thing? 
 
2. Description: Zav is a watery substance. It is produced by cactuses.  
Central: Zav is always kept in a metal can, because it corrodes any other 
materials. 
Non-Central: Zav is very corrosive. 
Scenario: Zav is used to clean off stains. Harry and Jane have just purchased an 
old, tumbledown house. They plan on cleaning and fixing it up. Harry goes to 
work cleaning the second floor of the house. He carries a lot of equipment 
upstairs with him, and on the way up, he drops the can of zav, which crashes 
down. Jane rushes over to see what the noise was. Harry calls down to see if 
everything is ok. Jane answers that everything is fine, and that the only damage 
was that ‘The can is dented.’ 
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Question: How acceptable would it have been for Jane to instead have said, ‘The 
zav is dented’ And have meant the same thing? 
 
 
3.1 Methods 
3.1.1 Participants 
32 college-age students, in exchange for course credit. 
 
3.1.2 Materials 
We constructed six items, three containers and three contents, each with a central and a 
non-central variant, as described above, and listed in Appendix 2. 
 
3.1.3 Procedure 
Participants read and answered each item using paper and pencil. In order to control for 
each participant’s prior willingness to shift, as well as to instruct them on the task, they 
first answered four scenarios using extant licensed and unlicensed English shifts (such as 
from DVD to movie, and vice versa). We normalized acceptability judgments for the 
target items over the mean of these scores.  
 Following these instructions, each participant received six novel words, half in their 
central form, half non-central, in one of three different orders. 
 
3.2 Results 
 If centrality and polysemy rules contribute to sense acceptability independently, 
both effects should be reliable. If licensed shifts make senses acceptable, we only expect 
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an effect of shift type. Finally, if centrality affects the application of licensed polysemy 
rules, the two factors should interact: while centrality should not influence the 
acceptability of unlicensed items, higher centrality should increase the acceptability of a 
licensed item. 
 Sense acceptability ratings (normalized over mean practice item ratings) are 
displayed in Figure 5. We analyzed them using a 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA (Shift 
Type: Licensed/Unlicensed and Centrality: Central/Non-Central), which revealed a 
reliable main effect of Shift Type (Licensed: M = 1.13 (SD = 0.55), Unlicensed: M = 0.85 
(0.41), F(1,31) = 13.19, p < .01) and a main effect of Centrality (Central M = 1.07 (0.55), 
Non-Central M = 0.89 (0.43), F(1,31) = 9.99, p < .01). But importantly, both effects were 
qualified by a reliable interaction between Shift Type and Centrality (F(1,31) = 6.7, p = 
.01). In particular, while centrality had a reliable effect on sense acceptability for items 
falling under a licensed shift (t(31) = 4.61, p < .01), it did not have a reliable effect for 
items falling under an unlicensed shift  (t(31) = -0.36, ns). This suggests that centrality is 
not an independent contributor to sense acceptability. Instead, senses are produced by the 
application of rules, and their acceptability is determined by their centrality. 
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Figure 4 
Caption: Acceptability is calculated as score assigned to the paraphrase normalized over 
the mean of the scores assigned to the practice items by the participant. 
 
 Finally, we examined whether simply being a potential container was enough to 
increase sense acceptability, regardless of whether that facet of the concept was made 
central. In fact, the non-central items that entered a licensed shift were no more 
acceptable than either the central or non-central items that entered an unlicensed shift 
(both t’s < 1.3, ns.). This, again, is consistent with the proposal that, to enter a shift, the 
relevant part of the concept has to be made central. 
 
RESTRICTING REGULAR POLYSEMY 
 29 
4 General Discussion 
 Although word meanings are flexible, they cannot change in infinite ways. A DVD 
can be shiny, or a DVD can be an hour long, but while a movie can be an hour long, it 
cannot be shiny. Rule-based models assume that these limits occur because a finite 
number of shifts generate possible senses. By contrast, radical pragmatic theories propose 
that the limits to word meaning reflect some structure in our concepts, so that the 
acceptability of a derived sense depends on whether it is closely related to the default 
sense. 
 In our data, the acceptability of a sense was well predicted by whether a word could 
enter into a polysemy rule but, contra the radical pragmatics models, it was not well 
predicted by any conceptual metrics. Conceptual centrality, which we argued was critical 
for the theories of Nunberg (1995), Fauconnier (1985) and various versions of Relevance 
Theory (Papafragou, 1996; Wilson, 2003), offered some predictive power, but not 
independently of proposed lexical rules. Other metrics, such as similarity, cue validity 
and salience offered no explanatory value above-and-beyond that provided by centrality. 
The results therefore provide evidence against the radical pragmatic accounts of sense 
shifts, and in favor of an account that relies on conventional rules. 
 As discussed in the introduction, various radical pragmatic theories have also 
endorsed the possibility that there might be polysemy conventions that exist alongside, or 
are built on top of, the pragmatic shifting system (Nunberg, 1995; Papafragou, 1996). 
These types of rules and conventions are consistent with our data, but the theories 
proposing them also necessarily predict that relationships between concepts should 
explain sense acceptability independently of any lexical rule (Fauconnier, 1985; Nunberg, 
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1979, 1995; Papafragou, 1996). This prediction was not met, for instance centrality did 
not affect acceptability for the unlicensed contents-container shifts in Experiment 2. 
 Our results are therefore more consistent with rule-based models than radical 
pragmatic ones. But while a fully gradient effect did not emerge in our data, Study 1 did 
demonstrate that senses produced by a rule have a tendency to be more central than 
senses that did not fall under a licensed rule. And moreover, senses produced by rules 
tended to be more acceptable when they had a central, or intrinsically important, 
connection to the original meaning. These results are not consistent with the radical 
pragmatics models discussed in the introduction, but nor are they consistent with a 
version of the rules model in which there is no link between concepts and the rules 
themselves, for example, a model in which rules are just arbitrary features of a language 
(e.g, Ostler & Atkins, 1992). 
 Instead, the results support a middle ground, partially built on the 
conventionalization accounts discussed above. In particular, we propose that a) aspects of 
world knowledge such as centrality do not directly cause sense acceptability, but b) 
conventional polysemy rules, which do license senses, arise to mark generally important 
and central relationships. Finally, c) the acceptability of the output of a polysemy rule 
(e.g., container-contents) is determined by whether the affected word meaning is a 
prototypical example of that relationship (i.e., a good example of a container). 
Importantly, this latter factor will be partially determined by centrality. For example, a 
good example of a container will be one whose contents play a central role in how it is 
conceptualized. 
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 There are certain caveats for this model given the present data. First, our claim is 
based on a set of null results, which means that we cannot rule out whether another factor 
might predict acceptability, such as a differently defined version of relevance. An effect 
might also be found using different means of collecting the same relations, either through 
alternately worded questions or a very well defined implicit task such as sorting or 
priming. But while it is risky to make broad inferences from such data, we believe that 
the large number of tested conceptual relations justifies it. 
 Second, we only had limited control over the effects of context in the sense 
acceptability judgments of Study 1. Context modulates the acceptability of a sense, but 
our acceptability judgments only used one context per sense, and the strength of this 
context was only set via intuition. It may be that some of the extreme acceptability 
judgments from Experiment 1 resulted from poorly chosen contexts (for instance 
adjectives that were polysemous6). Still, we suspect that our overall claims are robust 
because of the high number of tested items. 
 Finally, there is one situation where centrality might still have a direct effect on 
interpretation: deciphering fully novel references, as in Nunberg’s (1995) example The 
ham sandwich is at Table 7 (spoken in reference to a customer by a restaurant server). In 
these cases, an interpretation of ham sandwich as a food item is implausible, and so the 
speaker forces the listener to adopt a new interpretation. The search for an appropriate 
novel meaning might rely on centrality as a guide, both in comprehension and production 
(cf., Clark & Gerrig, 1983). An important goal for future research is to understand exactly 
                                                 
6 For instance, one question asked participants if ‘The book was thin’ could be 
paraphrased by ‘The story was thin.’ The acceptability clearly depends on whether thin is 
assigned a size sense, or the less-frequent poor quality/insufficient sense. 
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what guides the resolution of novel deferred references, and to understand when speakers 
might choose to force listeners to comprehend this type of fully novel reference. 
Conceptual structure may prove important in both cases. 
 The current results have particularly interesting implications for both the 
occurrence of regular polysemy cross-linguistically, and the development of polysemy 
rules in children. If polysemy rules are conventions, we expect considerable cross-
linguistic variation in their occurrence. Although cross-linguistic polysemy has not been 
systematically surveyed, isolated reports provide at least some support for this prediction. 
For instance, according to Kamei and Wakao (1992), the producer-product rule (for 
which they tested the example he read Mao) is considerably more acceptable in English 
and Japanese than Mandarin Chinese. 
 Conventional polysemy rules also set up a tricky learning problem for children, 
who need to avoid over- or underestimating the licensed patterns. This requires at least 
some restrictions on possible rules, otherwise children would initially consider far too 
broad a range (e.g., they might search for evidence for or against a headwear-crustacean 
rule). A metric such as centrality might provide that restriction: children could set an 
upper bound on possible rules by assuming that polysemy only encodes particularly 
central relationships (see Schütze (1997) for a similar proposal regarding 
subcategorization frames). Rabagliati et al. (2010) provide some tentative evidence for 
this. They show that relatively young children (4-6 years) overestimate which senses are 
possible, but they do not wildly overestimate. While they accept licensed senses (e.g., the 
hour-long DVD) and some unlicensed senses (e.g., the shiny movie), they reject senses 
that cannot be easily connected to the original meaning (e.g., the angry rock). This 
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pattern of early generality and later rule-based specificity suggests considerable 
developmental change in lexical representations: While adults assign senses based on 
rules, children may well be radically pragmatic. 
 
Appendix A 
Experiment 1 stimuli. Each bracket contains (Noun1 [enters unlicensed shift], 
Context1 [selects Noun1 sense] & Noun2 [enters licensed shift], Context2 [selects 
Noun2 sense]). 
 
Container-Content 
(liquid, stirred & pot, cracked); (water, boiling & kettle, smashed); (juice, poured & 
pitcher, broken); (magic potion, cooled & cauldron, metal); (milk, spilled & glass, 
plastic); (drink, delicious & bottle, warped); (flowers, fragrant & vase, chipped); (meal, 
filling & plate, glazed); (tea, steaming & mug, porcelain); (tuna, expired & can, dented); 
(jam, fresh & jar, dusted); (food, tasty & bowl, split); (meat, sizzling & pan, scratched); 
(trash, recycled & dumpster, graffitied); (sand, leaking & bucket, leaky) 
 
Institution-Person 
(pilot, contacted the tower & plane, twin-engined); (shopkeeper, wrote to the customer & 
store, made by a builder); (doctor, called the lady & hospital, built out of bricks); 
(receptionist, answered the phone & hotel, four stories tall); (students, appeared on TV & 
kindergarten, contained 10 classrooms); (tour, greeted the visitors & museum, guide 
closed in the winter); (mayor, hall popular & city, baroque); (monarch, criticized & 
palace, whitewashed); (monks, sang beautifully & monastery, beautifully decorated); 
(teacher, listened to the parents & school, designed in New York); (motorist, spoke with 
the security guard & car, repaired); (driver, waved at the group & truck, weighed two 
tons); (people, liberal & city, 7 miles wide); (passengers, talkative & train, had four 
carriages); (captain, fired the crew & ship, moored) 
 
Object-Abstract 
(story, about a boy & book, thin); (adventure, set in space & comic, red and green); 
(movie, an hour long & DVD, round); (song, loud & CD, shiny); (show, about animals & 
videotape, plastic); (plot, well paced & novel, in hardback); (recording, poorly mastered 
& cassette, snapped); (music, explicit & mp3, zipped); (information, well researched & 
encyclopedia, 100lb); (news, shocking & newspaper, torn); (food, delicious & recipe, 
well-written); (message, urgent & note, folded); (slogan, rude & t-shirt, size 5); (pattern, 
symmetrical & flag, torn); (documents, controversial & binder, shut);  
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Producer-Product 
(book, proof-read & writer, bald); (music, performed & composer, smelly); (building, 
commissioned & architect, laughing); (sculpture, archived & sculptor, rich); (novel, re-
issued & novelist, tall); (picture, displayed & artist, smiling); (song, recorded & singer, 
trained); (painting, catalogued & painter, hairy); (film, edited & filmmaker, rich); (article, 
published & journalist, unwashed); (play, rediscovered & playwright, shy); (photograph, 
exhibited & photographer, loud); (dance, technical & dancer, well-trained); (poem, read 
& poet, washed); (design, bootlegged & designer, arrogant);  
 
 
Appendix B 
Items used in Experiment 2 
Container-Contents 
3. Description: A blittle is a spherical, plastic object with a flat base and a hole in 
the top 
Central: Blittles are made in Ecuador, where they are used to store 
marbles. Their round shape means that they can store a lot of marbles. 
Non-Central: Blittles are made in Ecuador, where they are given as gifts. 
Scenario: Maria was playing with her son Juan. Suddenly, the phone rang. It is an 
important call, and Maria needs to talk for a long time, so she gave Juan a blittle, 
which she had filled with marbles, to play with. After the phone call, Maria finds 
Juan. She sees that he has taken all the marbles and put them into groups of the 
same color. She asks him what he did, and he replies, ‘I sorted the marbles.’ 
Question: How acceptable would it have been for Juan to instead have said, ‘I 
sorted the blittle’, and have meant the same thing? 
 
4. Description: A ternway is a large metal object. Ternways are found on farms. 
Central: They are strong but hollow. Farmers fill them with water, so that 
animals can drink from them. 
Non-Central: They are strong but hollow. Farmers use them to build 
temporary constructions and shelters for their animals. 
Scenario: One day, Harry was inspecting one of his ternways. It was full of 
water. At that moment, his neighbor, Bob walked by. Bob stopped to say hello. 
As they chatted, Harry rested his hand on the ternway. He absent-mindedly 
stirred the water with his finger.  
Question: How acceptable would it have been to instead have said that, ‘He 
absent-mindedly stirred the ternway with his finger.’ and have meant the same 
thing? 
 
5. Description: A shiffle is a large wooden thing. It has pretty engravings on the 
outside, and is hollow.  
Central: Shiffles are made in New Zealand, where they are used to collect 
and store fruit. 
Non-Central: Shiffles are made in New Zealand, where they are used for 
decoration in people's gardens. 
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Scenario: John owns a ranch on New Zealand’s South Island. Behind his house, 
there is a beautiful orchard, filled with fruit trees. John had harvested a lot of 
apples, and left them in his shiffle. Unfortunately, the apples started to rot. When 
John found out, he was very disappointed. He emptied the apples into the 
compost near the orchard. 
Question: How acceptable would it have been to instead have said that ‘He 
emptied the shiffle into the compost near the orchard' and have meant the same 
thing? 
 
 
Contents-Container 
6. Description: Backle is a gooey black candy made out of sugar.  
Central: Backle is kept in small plastic packets so you can take it hiking, 
because it’s a great energy source. 
Non-Central: Backle is full of energy, so that people eat it when they go 
hiking. 
Scenario: Jane and Larry were planning on going for a long hike. Jane went to 
the store and bought some backle. Later, on their hike, Larry and Jane are walking 
through some wild roses. Unfortunately, Larry catches his packet of backle on a 
thorn, and it tears. He curses, and tells Jane ‘I caught my packet on a thorn.’ 
Question: How acceptable would it have been for Larry to instead have said ‘I 
caught my backle on a thorn’, and have meant the same thing? 
 
7. Description: Blika is a soft, gooey and green substance. It grows on trees in 
Central Alegre, in Brazil. 
Central: Blika is always kept in special jars, so that you can heat it, 
because when it is hot it drives away insects. 
Non-Central: When you heat Blika, it drives away insects. 
Scenario: Ricardo and Maria are having a small party. Unfortunately, there are 
lots of mosquitos around that evening, and they don’t have any Blika left in their 
house Ricardo goes to the store to buy some. Unfortunately, he slips and falls on 
the way home, and the jar of blika gets shattered. When he gets home he 
apologizes to Maria, saying ‘I broke the pot!’ 
Question: How acceptable would it have been for Ricardo to instead have said “I 
broke the blika!” And have meant the same thing? 
 
8. Description: Zav is a watery substance. It is produced by cactuses.  
Central: Zav is always kept in a metal can, because it corrodes any other 
materials. 
Non-Central: Zav is very corrosive. 
Scenario: Zav is used to clean off stains. Harry and Jane have just purchased an 
old, tumbledown house. They plan on cleaning and fixing it up. Harry goes to 
work cleaning the second floor of the house. He carries a lot of equipment 
upstairs with him, and on the way up, he drops the can of zav, which crashes 
down. Jane rushes over to see what the noise was. Harry calls down to see if 
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everything is ok. Jane answers that everything is fine, and that the only damage 
was that ‘The can is dented.’ 
Question: How acceptable would it have been for Jane to instead have said, ‘The 
zav is dented’ And have meant the same thing? 
 
 
 
Appendix C 
Example training script (centrality) 
 
We are going to ask you to do some tasks. In the first task, we will ask you questions 
about a number of different every-day things and people, and how they relate to other 
every-day things and people. In particular, we’re going to ask you to imagine an ideal 
version of an object, say, some ideal fruit. Then, we’re going to ask you about that same 
object that’s missing something it may be normally associated with. We want you to tell 
us whether missing that thing affects whether that object is ideal, or not. 
 
This is a little complicated, so lets go through an example. First, think about fruit. Think 
about what some ideal fruit would be like. Now, imagine that you found some fruit that 
was not associated with a fruit vendor on the street. How similar would that fruit be to 
some ideal fruit? To what extent does “not being associated with a fruit vendor” affect 
whether something is ideal? 
 
Probably your answer is that it is not important, and that fruit is still relatively similar to 
some ideal fruit. For example, it could be plucked straight off a tree and eaten, and that 
seems like a pretty ideal piece of fruit. 
 
Here’s another question: Think about an ideal mechanic, the sort of mechanic you would 
imagine if you had to describe what you would want a mechanic to be like. Now, how 
similar is a mechanic who is not associated with any tools to an ideal mechanic? This one 
is harder. Its pretty important to being a mechanic that you use tools a lot, so a mechanic 
who never uses tools would be non-ideal. So here, you’d probably say that the mechanic 
is not very similar to an ideal mechanic. 
 
We’re going to ask you these questions, and you will answer them, via the computer 
terminals in front of you [participants then answer practice questions on the computer 
terminal]. 
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